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The Current State of Workers’
Compensation
Benefit Adequacy, Return to Work, and Prevention
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Various plan-design
elements have emerged
that seem to provide better
adequacy of workers’
compensation benefits
than the medical-based
impairment and gross earnings
replacement approach.
n Disability management
techniques appear to have the
capacity to significantly reduce
the burden of work-related
disability for both workers and
employers in our workplaces.
n Workers’ compensation
programs have tools available
to improve employer safety
and prevention performance.

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE
Regulating Access to
Work in the Gig Labor
Market: The Case of Uber
Morris M. Kleiner
page 4

Marcus Dillender and H. Allan Hunt
Workers’ compensation programs are statelevel insurance programs that provide medical
care and income replacement benefits for people
injured at work. Although states’ rules differ
along various dimensions, each state other than
Texas has statutes that require employers to
provide insurance with specified benefits. Since
each workers’ compensation program is unique,
comparisons across programs can be complicated
or impossible. Moreover, data on occupational
injuries, compensation, safety, and accommodation
practices at firms are typically unavailable. When
data are available, they can be suspect and suffer
from the disadvantage that they often come from
a single jurisdiction. Also, since different data and
methods are used across studies, results can be
difficult to compare across studies and to generalize
to other workers’ compensation systems. The result
is a rather sparse and dubious-quality research
literature.
In our new book, Workers’ Compensation:
Analysis for Its Second Century (see p. 7), we
discuss and analyze the status of state workers’
compensation programs along the three
dimensions of benefit adequacy, return to work,
and prevention incentives using the research record
that has been compiled to date. We highlight the
often-contrasting incentives that firms, workers,
and insurers face as they operate within these
programs. We consider recent trends in workers’
compensation, discuss innovations that have yet to
be evaluated, and try to draw conclusions from the
research whenever possible and point to gaps in
our knowledge that future research should address.
Benefit Adequacy
The chapter on benefit adequacy reviews recent
studies of workers’ compensation in Canada
and Michigan. Michigan is unique because,

unlike other states, it does not have a statutory
designation of permanent partial disability. And as
a “wage-loss” state, Michigan law provides that lost
earnings benefits shall be paid for the duration of
the disability, with a few exceptions. This contrasts
with other states with an “impairment” orientation,
where a medical assessment of the degree of
disability is made and benefit payments are
derived from that rating. Furthermore, there is no
designation of the level of disability in Michigan,
so there is no impairment rating available, only a
record of the payments made. Canadian workers’
compensation systems are similar to those in the
United States except that all workers’ compensation
insurance is with public entities, benefits are
typically more generous, and waiting periods are
shorter or nonexistent.
A study from the Workers Compensation
Research Institute finds that the Michigan workers’
compensation system provides more adequate
benefits than many other state systems (Savych and
Hunt 2017). Figure 1 charts workers’ compensation
benefits and postinjury earnings for workers with
more than one month of lost work time or a lumpsum settlement compared to earnings of similar
workers with injuries that did not qualify for wage
replacement benefits. There is a marked drop in
earnings after the injury and a decline in earnings
that lasts at least five years, but the addition of
workers’ compensation benefits brings the earnings
replacement rate to 97 percent at 5 years and 88
percent when projected out to 10 years.
This performance appears to be largely due
to the wage-loss orientation and the “spendable
earnings” wage replacement formula used in
Michigan. Taking account of income taxes,
payroll taxes, and family size clearly provides the
opportunity for tailoring wage-loss replacement
more closely to apparent need across all workers.
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So, despite a lower maximum benefit
in Michigan, set at 90 percent of the
state average weekly wage versus 100
percent in most U.S. jurisdictions,
workers’ compensation wage-loss
benefits in Michigan look pretty good.
But if benefits in Michigan appear to be
higher than those in some other states,
they are clearly not as generous as in
the Canadian systems that have been
subjected to similar wage-loss studies.
Return to Work
While ensuring adequate
compensation is a basic legislated
priority of workers’ compensation,
returning injured workers to
employment swiftly and safely lowers
compensation costs for employers and
helps workers by raising their incomes
and by serving as part of their physical
and emotional recovery from an injury.
In our chapter on return to work,
we discuss disability management

techniques designed to improve returnto-work performance that include
maintaining close contact with the
injured worker, improving medical
management, and accommodating
limitations at work.
Disability management’s promise
for improving the return-to-work
performance of workers’ compensation
systems is reflected in the proliferation
of state policy innovations that directly
or indirectly support or encourage
these interventions. Credible evidence
on the impact of return-to-work
programs is sparse but promising.
Reductions of up to 40 percent in
disability duration have been reported
among large self-insured firms
(McLaren, Reville, and Seabury 2010),
and several review articles have found
strong empirical support for the effects
of disability management techniques.
The widespread adoption of
such techniques among private

Figure 1 Average Quarterly Earnings, Workers’ Compensation Income Replacement Benefits,
and Reweighted Comparison Earnings, by Quarter from Injury, Injuries in Michigan in 2004
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employers throughout the 1990s also
demonstrates their efficacy. Figure 2
shows how the balance has shifted from
injuries with days away from work
to those with restricted activity only.
This serves as evidence of the spread
of disability management techniques.
We conclude that properly motivated
disability management techniques can
remove many barriers to return-towork for workers with impairments,
which reduces both workers’
compensation costs for employers and
lost wages for workers.
Prevention
As the need for income benefits
and return-to-work considerations
can both be avoided if injuries are
prevented in the first place, we also
discuss how workers’ compensation
insurance can affect both workers’
and firms’ prevention efforts. As can
be seen in Figure 3, average wage
loss benefits and average medical
benefits have both fallen since the early
1990s as occupational injury rates
have dropped, but wage loss benefits
have fallen much more dramatically
than medical benefits. The increased
medical benefits as a percentage of
all workers’ compensation benefits
makes the need for prevention efforts
an important component of cost
containment considerations regardless
of a state’s benefit adequacy.
In the chapter on prevention, we
discuss how workers’ compensation
alters both firms’ and workers’ inherent
incentives to prevent occupational
injuries and diseases. For workers,
more adequate compensation benefits
reduce the costs of injuries, which
lower their incentives to avoid injury.
For firms with experience-rated
premiums, higher claim costs increase
future premiums, meaning that
experience rating gives firms a financial
incentive to improve safety. Empirical
work has devoted considerable
attention to trying to understand
which of these conflicting effects
dominates, but it is often stymied by
the simultaneous effect of workers’
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Conclusions
Given the current state of
knowledge, we believe that workers’
compensation programs could be
improved along several dimensions.
However, there seems to be a
reluctance to consider improvements
under the existing political
environment. More research is needed
on various workers’ compensation
issues, but we also believe that there
are reasons for optimism about the
three performance dimensions that
we consider. With benefit adequacy,
various plan-design elements have
emerged that seem to provide better
adequacy of workers’ compensation
benefits than the medical-based
impairment and gross earnings
replacement approach. With return
to work, disability management
techniques appear to have the
capacity to significantly reduce the
burden of work-related disability for
both workers and employers in our
workplaces. With prevention, workers’
compensation programs appear to have
tools available to improve employer
safety and prevention performance.

Figure 2 National Trends in Rates Associated with Lost Workdays
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Figure 3 Workers’ Compensation Medical and Cash Benefits per $100 of Covered Wages,
1980–2012
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compensation benefits on reporting
incentives conditional on the number
of true injuries at a firm. When benefits
are higher, workers have an increased
incentive to report injuries, while firms
have incentives to suppress reporting
of injuries.
Although much existing empirical
evidence points to a positive
relationship between frequency of
injuries and the level of workers’
compensation benefits (e.g., Krueger
1990; Ruser 1985), we feel the evidence
is not persuasive that better workers’
compensation benefits actually
encourage workers to act more
recklessly. However, making workers’
compensation premiums more
accurately reflect the previous claims
history of individual employers appears
to improve employers’ safety and
prevention efforts, as well as encourage
employers to devote more attention to
the worker’s successful return to work.
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Count us among those who believe
that today’s workers’ compensation
programs have the potential to serve
for another 100 years, but they will
require significant improvement. We
call upon legislative bodies to address
current shortcomings, and we call
upon the research community to
provide appropriate guidance for these
efforts.
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Regulating Access to Work
in the Gig Labor Market
The Case of Uber
Morris M. Kleiner
U.S. labor markets traditionally
have included long-term employment
relationships that last many years
or decades. They also have been
characterized by internal labor
markets, unions, and a web of rules
that, often by law, both employers and
workers are required to observe. New
innovations and technologies, such as
smart phones and their accompanying
apps, have allowed labor markets to
become more fluid and responsive
to spot market supply and demand
conditions. They have allowed workers
more flexibility in their choice of hours
worked, and have allowed consumers
to better evaluate the quality of
services. As a result, gig labor markets,
which let workers easily book jobs by
the hour or project, have grown and
flourished. The number of workers
directly working through apps now
comprise nearly 1 percent of the total
workforce, making gig labor markets
one of the fastest growing areas in the
labor force (Katz and Krueger 2016;
Torpey and Hogan 2016).
Workers who have entered the
gig labor market have few of the
government regulations or web of
rules that govern traditional labor
markets. In addition, labor laws such as
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
National Labor Relations Act usually
do not apply to these workers (Harris

and Krueger 2015). Yet one area of
labor market regulation, occupational
licensing, is pervasive, and in this
article, I examine the interaction of this
institution in one large company that
operates largely in the gig economy.
The Uber Innovation
The ride-sharing firm Uber
has come to exemplify the recent
technology “revolution” and labor
market outcomes embodied in the
gig economy. It had 84–87 percent
of the total ride-sharing trips (i.e.,
cab-substitute markets) in 2016 and
is currently active in 450 cities in
the United States and worldwide.1
Uber began offering its first rides in
2010 in San Francisco and in New
York City in 2011 as a way to match
individuals who needed rides to work
or recreation with those individuals
who were willing to provide those rides
for a price. The creation of an app and
accompanying software allowed this
matching process to be done in an
efficient and profitable manner for the
company (Roth and Ockenfels 2002).
Uber takes a percentage of the ride
price for the company as their fee for
matching the drivers and riders. The
drivers anticipate an ample supply of
customers, and the waiting times for
drivers in traditional cabs were reduced
and revenues enhanced for those

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS

Download this WEfocus book for free at
research.upjohn.org/up_press/244/.

n The number of workers directly working through apps now comprise nearly 1 percent of the total workforce, making gig labor markets one of the fastest growing areas
in the labor force.

Marcus Dillender is senior economist and H. Allan
Hunt is senior economist emeritus, both at the Upjohn
Institute.

n Evidence from a quasi-experiment in New York and New Jersey suggests that
there are few gains from occupational licensing of ride-sharing providers as assessed
through customer satisfaction or measures of customer safety.
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Regulations for Driving
One of the major labor market
issues affecting Uber drivers is
occupational licensing (Porter
2015). About one-quarter of the U.S.
workforce must acquire a license from
the government in order to work
for pay (Bureau of Labor Statistics
2016). In some cities—New York, for
example—ride-sharing without a taxi
license is illegal. The requirements
for licensure in New York City are
stringent, and the licensure process
takes three months on average, with
upfront costs of at least $2,000. In
addition, the driver must complete
a defensive driving course, pass a
medical exam, be subjected to a
drug test, undergo fingerprint and
background checks, take classes on
wheelchair-accessible vehicle training,
acquire a commercial vehicle license,
and purchase commercial vehicle
insurance. These substantial fixed costs
result in fewer drivers but much lower

turnover rates for Uber drivers in New
York than in any other U.S. city where
the company operates; they also result
in longer working hours (Hall et al.
2017). Figure 1 shows driver turnover
by city. New York City has lower
turnover, and Houston, which has few
regulations for drivers, has relatively
high turnover of drivers.
Figure 2 shows that the ratio of New
York Uber drivers to the population of
the city or the metropolitan statistical
area is considerably lower than either
Chicago or San Francisco, and the base
prices are higher (Hall et al. 2017).
Although traditional medallion taxi
drivers can serve as substitutes for
Uber drivers in any city, the number
of Uber drivers in New York is
considerably lower than in Chicago
or San Francisco. Also, the base Uber
fares in Chicago and San Francisco are
lower than those in New York City for
both 2015 and 2016.
Evaluating Quality
One of the least studied areas of
occupational licensing is its influence

on the quality of services (Kleiner
and Kudrle 2000). However, a recent
analysis in the New York City/New
Jersey area notes that drivers who
sign up to drive on the Uber app can
perform pickups in New Jersey, which
is directly on the opposite side of the
Hudson River from New York City,
but drivers who sign-up in New Jersey,
which does not require an occupational
license, cannot perform pickups in the
city (Hall et al. 2017). Thus, the study
compares quality and safety outcomes
for rides performed in New Jersey by
New York City and New Jersey drivers.
There is quasi-random assignment
of rides because Uber’s dispatch
algorithm, which determines the driver
for a particular ride request, is based
on factors other than licensing. While
the algorithm has evolved over time, it
is mainly based on a driver’s proximity
to a rider’s location (also based on time
to the customer). Consequently, a ride
is essentially randomly assigned to a
licensed driver from New York City or
an unlicensed driver from New Jersey
for pick-up requests that occur in many

Figure 1 Percent of Uber Driver-Partners Remaining Active, by City
100
New York City

Percent of Uber driver-partners remaining active

providing rides. Drivers can choose
when and how many hours they want
to work. In 2017 the company had
more than 734,000 active drivers in the
United States and more than 1,500,000
drivers worldwide.2 The economic
value of the company is estimated to be
almost $70 billion, and despite recent
negative publicity, it is still one of the
major economic success stories and
labor market innovators (Bensinger
2017).
One unique aspect of the Uber
performance evaluation system is that
the customer evaluates the driver and
vice-versa on a scale of one to five, with
five being the highest. The majority—
nearly 86 percent—of drivers earn
a rating of 5. Drivers and customers
whose ratings fall below a specified
value determined by the company lose
their ability to access the app and are
effectively fired from using the ridesharing system. Consequently, there
are incentives for both customers and
drivers to do well in their respective
roles.
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parts of New Jersey. The results of the
data analysis using the quasi-random
assignment of rides methodology
show very little statistically significant
differences in measured quality by
riders through measures of rider
satisfaction. Also, there was little or no
difference in the safety of rides based
on the number of driver hard stops,
rapid accelerations, or complaints to
the company of poor ride performance,
based on whether the driver was from
a jurisdiction that required a license in
order to work.
Implications for Policy
Two of the most rapidly growing
segments of the labor market are
the growth of the gig economy and
occupational regulations in the
labor market through licensing by
government. Uber is faced with both
issues because of its business model.
As current findings suggest, cities that
impose rigorous licensing standards,
such as New York, have fewer Uber
drivers per capita and higher base fares
than either Chicago or San Francisco.

The evidence from a quasi-experiment
in New York and New Jersey suggests
that there are few gains from
occupational licensing of ride-sharing
providers as assessed through customer
satisfaction or measures of customer
safety. Before state or local government
enact additional regulations, access to
the labor market and its influence on
customer prices, satisfaction, and safety
need to be considered as key elements
of governmental labor market licensing
policies.

-loss-as-finance-head-leaves-1496272500
(accessed June 28, 2017).
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New Books from the Upjohn Press
Extending Work Life
Can Employers Adapt
When Employees Want
to Delay Retirement?

Robert Clark and Melinda Sandler Morrill
According to the authors of this WEfocus Series
book, “Many policy analysts, economists, and
demographers have argued that individuals must
extend their work lives if they are to achieve their
desired standard of
living in retirement.
Increases in longevity
imply that individuals
who leave the labor
force at traditional
retirement ages
must either save
more during their
working careers or
consume less during
their retirement. Reductions in the generosity of
employer- and government-funded retirement
programs exacerbate this problem. Thus, workers
today must save more than their predecessors to
achieve the same level of retirement well-being.
The idea seems clear—working longer and
retiring later is the only way future retirees can
sufficiently finance their retirement.”
While working longer may be necessary to
support more years in retirement, few studies
have examined this phenomenon from the
employer perspective. This book seeks to fill that
gap by providing a comprehensive assessment
of the costs and benefits to employers of
accommodating an increasing desire for delayed
or phased retirement.

WE
focus
series
88 pp. 2016
$14.99 paper 978-0-88099-528-3
PDF is free at research.upjohn.org/up_press/237/

How Did Employee
Ownership Firms
Weather the Last Two
Recessions?
Employee Ownership,
Employment Stability, and
Firm Survival: 1999–2011
Fidan Ana Kurtulus and Douglas L. Kruse
Employee ownership firms offer workers the
opportunity to own a stake in the firms where
they work. This
affords them the
ability to share in
profits and have a
voice in firm-related
decision making. In
this comprehensive
new book, Kurtulus
and Kruse provide
new evidence on
whether employee
ownership firms are better equipped to survive
recessions. In particular, they focus on broadbased employee ownership, which includes
ownership at all levels in the firm’s hierarchy.
The authors begin by defining employee
ownership, and then discuss the prevalence of such
firms in the United States. They also examine how
employee ownership affects employment stability
and why employee ownership firms have survived
recessions more successfully than other firms.
Kurtulus and Kruse conclude by saying that the
benefits they observed in employee ownership
firms, particularly the greater employment
stability and survival rates, can help the overall
economy. Therefore, increased government
support to broaden employee ownership
programs is merited.
178 pp. 2016
$18 paper 978-0-88099-525-2
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-526-9

Workers’Compensation:
Analysis for Its Second
Century
H. Allan Hunt and Marcus Dillender
Workers’ compensation (WC) is the original form
of social insurance as well as the first no-fault
insurance program. Under WC, workers receive
compensation
and treatment for
workplace injuries
and disease in
exchange for giving
up the right to sue
their employers for
negligence. Each
state and Canadian
province runs its own
WC program, and
how each is administered and the level of benefits
provided vary considerably. Therefore, assessing
best practices among these programs is tricky.
H. Allan Hunt and Marcus Dillender provide a
succinct analysis of the state of WC programs
in North America by focusing on three key
performance issues: 1) the adequacy of
compensation for those disabled in the
workplace, 2) return-to-work performance for
injured workers, and 3) prevention of disabling
injury and disease. Following a brief introductory
chapter that provides a discussion of the
difficulties of trying to compare so many diverse
programs, Hunt and Dillender devote a chapter
to each of the three performance issues and
provide empirical findings and useful guidance
for policymakers and researchers as they set
their sights on adapting WC for the twenty-first
century.

WE
focus
series
132 pp. 2017
$14.99 paper 978-0-88099-530-6
PDF is free at research.upjohn.org/up_press/244/
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